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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted to strengthen corporate governance 
practices in the United States; since SOX enactment, the audit committee has received increasing 
emphasis in accounting research. The objective of this study is to review and synthesize the 
growing volume of audit committee literature in the post-SOX era. While summarizing the post-
SOX literature, this study also focuses on selected pre-SOX studies to compare the research 
issues and findings of pre- and post-SOX literature and to show how governance reforms shape 
the literature’s domain. The extant audit committee literature reflects an enormous body of 
knowledge. Both the pre- and post-SOX literature establishes the notion that independent and 
expert audit committees enhance the effectiveness of audit committee monitoring processes and 
improve the quality of financial reporting and auditing. These findings supplement the scholarly 
support for SOX requirements. In the post-SOX era, researchers have focused on issues driven 
by SOX. However, other issues that are not addressed in SOX have also emerged, including 
audit committee compensation and committee members’ social ties with the chief executive 
officer and supervisory or other expertize of the audit committee members. While the literature 
contains predominantly experimental research, there is ample room for future research that can 
shed light on more theoretical issues. Future researchers can investigate unanswered questions by 




1.0 Introduction  
In response to major financial scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was 
enacted to strengthen corporate governance systems to protect shareholders from fraudulent 
accounting practices. SOX enhances the power and responsibility of audit committees, which 
play a crucial role in ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, external auditing, 
and risk management through their diligent oversight efforts. Shortly after SOX was enacted, 
researchers began to investigate the effectiveness of its requirements regarding audit committee 
composition and monitoring processes. This study provides a thorough review of the post-SOX 
audit committee literature that uses exclusively post-SOX data and investigates the effectiveness 
of SOX with regard to audit committee monitoring processes. While summarizing the post-SOX 
research, this study also focuses on selected pre-SOX studies to compare the trends and findings 
in the pre- and post-SOX audit committee literature.  
Post-SOX audit committee literature has addressed several aspects of audit committees 
and their impact on oversight processes. Even in the pre-SOX era, the issue of audit committee 
effectiveness received enormous importance in the accounting literature. Before 2002, legislators 
and regulators also emphasized the need to improve audit committee effectiveness by issuing, for 
example, the Blue Ribbon Committee Report of 1999, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) disclosure rules 1999b, and the 2000 National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD) report on audit committees. Thus, the issue of audit committee effectiveness has been 
important in both the pre- and post-SOX eras.  
Based on the time line, in this study I have classified the audit committee-related research 
to date into two groups: (1) pre-SOX literature, which includes papers published before 2002 and 
papers published after 2002 using data from before 2002 and (2) post-SOX literature, which uses 
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exclusively post-SOX data (data from after 2002). The classification was based on interest in 
determining how SOX requirements have affected the trends and findings in audit committee 
research. Exhibit 1 shows the time line classification of the audit committee literature.   
[Insert Exhibit 1] 
This study has three objectives. First is to summarize the audit committee-related 
research and provide an overview of the principal findings of post-SOX researchers that used 
exclusively data from after 2002. This will help future researchers establish a precise 
understanding of what has already been investigated. The second objective is to compare pre- 
and post-SOX research trends and findings. This comparison will help in understanding how 
SOX has influenced the path of scholarly investigation. The third objective is to identify the gaps 
and inconsistencies in the existing literature, which will help in identifying promising 
opportunities for future research. Thus, this paper will contribute by evaluating existing theories 
and findings in audit committee-related research in the post-SOX era.  
The post-SOX literature presents substantial evidence that SOX requirements play a 
significant role in enhancing audit committees’ quality, power, and effectiveness. The thrust of 
this research is the theory that firms can improve financial reporting, audit quality, and internal 
control by complying with audit committee-related SOX requirements. The studies reviewed 
within this paper were based on empirical, analytical, and experimental research conducted after 
2002. To assess the post-SOX audit committee research, this review focused on studies 
published in top-ranked mainstream accounting and auditing journals: The Accounting Review 
(TAR), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), 
Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR), Review of Accounting Studies (RAST), Journal of 
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Accounting and Public Policy (JAPP), Accounting, Organizations, and Society (AOS), and 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (AJPT). The keyword ‘audit committee’ was used to 
search for relevant studies. As part of the article search for this review, titles and/or abstracts of 
articles found in these journals were carefully examined for relevant research. Unpublished 
working papers were not included in the review. However, two conference papers were included 
for two reasons. First, the research issues discussed in those papers are directly relevant to audit 
committee-related SOX requirements. Second, these papers are the continuation or part of a 
series of other papers discussed in this study.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses audit committee-
related sections in SOX. In section 3, the domain and a classification of audit committee research 
in relation to SOX is discussed. Section 4.1 provides a summary of the post-SOX literature that 
focuses on audit committee effectiveness and external auditing. Section 4.2 focuses on the 
financial reporting process. Section 4.3 highlights earning management issues and section 4.4 
reviews audit committee studies that focused on internal control deficiencies. Section 4.5 
provides a summary of other issues, including litigation risks, market reaction, and the audit 
committee oversight process. Finally, section 4 provides concluding remarks and directions for 
future research.  
2.0 The Audit Committee and SOX  
The audit committee has been defined in several ways in several contexts. In Sec. 2, SOX 
offers the following definition:  
“The term ‘audit committee’ means a committee (or equivalent body) established by and 
amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and 
5 
 
financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer; 
and if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of the 
issuer.” 
In light of this definition, it is obvious that the ultimate goal of the audit committee is to 
ensure financial reporting quality and independent external auditing. Audit committee 
composition (expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity) and other characteristics (well-
defined responsibilities, access to management, incentives) of audit committees are the most 
significant issues related to achieving this goal.  
The SEC requires all public companies to maintain a standing audit committee that is 
responsible for carrying out its duties in the manner prescribed by SOX. Under section 301 of 
SOX, each audit committee of a listed company is to be “directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight” of the outside auditor, and the auditors are to report 
directly to the audit committee. Section 301(3) also emphasizes independence of the audit 
committee. According to SOX, each member of the audit committee should be independent. To 
be independent, an audit committee member should not “accept any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee” from the firm.  
Section 407 of SOX requires all public companies to disclose the financial expertise of 
audit committee members. In defining “financial expert,” the act considers a member’s 
qualifications through his or her “education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a 
principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer.” An “understanding of 
generally accepted accounting principles, and experience in preparing or auditing of financial 
statements” can also be considered “financial expertise” according to the act.   
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3.0 The Domain of Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature  
To organize the literature review, I classify the area of post-SOX audit committee 
research into five main domains: external auditing, financial reporting process, internal control 
deficiencies, earnings management, and other studies. Exhibit 2 provides a simplified 
classification of the domain of post-SOX audit committee literature. Most researchers have 
investigated the impacts of audit committee composition criteria and the effectiveness of 
financial reporting and auditing quality. Overall, the post-SOX literature establishes the notion 
that independent and expert audit committees help in reducing earnings management and internal 
control deficiencies and improve financial reporting and audit quality. These findings 
supplement the significance and implications of SOX. Researchers have also documented a 
causal link between audit committee compensation and financial reporting quality, as well as 
audit committee expertise and positive stock price reaction.   
[Insert Exhibit 2] 
SOX emphasizes the authority and responsibility of audit committees in monitoring 
external auditors. Post-SOX audit committee research has mainly focused on audit committee 
composition criteria (e.g., independence, expertise, multiple directorships, compensation) and 
their impact on internal and external auditing quality. The issues addressed in this area include 
auditor-client negotiation, audit fees, non-audit services provided by external auditors, and 
auditors’ restatement recommendations, among others. Audit committee members should 
understand the financial reporting process since the committee’s main responsibility is to ensure 
the integrity of the company’s financial reporting. SOX requires that audit committee members 
have financial and accounting expertise and independence. Therefore, post-SOX literature has 
investigated the independence and expertise of the audit committee and its impact on financial 
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reporting quality. Earnings management and internal control deficiencies are two other important 
areas addressed in the post-SOX audit committee literature. Using post-SOX data, researchers 
have investigated how audit committee composition criteria (especially independence and 
expertise) are associated with firms’ earning management practices and internal control 
problems. The post-SOX audit committee literature also highlights other issues, such as audit 
committee expertise and market reaction, audit committee oversight processes, and audit 
committee criteria and litigation risk.   
[Insert Exhibit 3] 
Exhibit 3 illustrates the domain of post-SOX audit committee literature. As defined by 
SOX, the main responsibility of the audit committee is to monitor the auditor and the 
management of the company. To ensure an effective monitoring process, SOX focuses on the 
criteria for composition (especially independence), which can be considered the ‘determinants’ 
or ‘input’ of an effective monitoring process. Though the issue of audit committee compensation 
is not addressed in SOX, an incentive policy plays an important role in audit committees’ 
monitoring processes. The post-SOX literature documents how cash or stock-based 
compensation is associated with the audit committee oversight process. The audit committee 
serves as the watchdog to protect shareholders’ interests from any opportunistic behavior of 
management or auditors. The ‘effectiveness’ or ‘output’ of the audit committees’ oversight 
process can be judged by examining whether firms have independent audit reports and quality 
financial reporting or whether they practice earnings management or have internal control 
problems. The post-SOX audit committee literature delineates both the ‘input’ (determinants) 
and ‘output’ (effectiveness) of the audit committee monitoring process.  
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Although most of the issues discussed in the post-SOX literature are also addressed in the 
pre-SOX era, in some cases the findings and interpretations differ. For example, using pre-SOX 
data, DeZoort et al. (2003) documented that audit committee members’ support for the auditor in 
a dispute with management was often contingent on contextual factors such as whether the 
financial statement adjustment was related to an annual or quarterly report. However, after SOX, 
DeZoort et al. (2008) replicated their pre-SOX study and found that audit committee members 
who are certified public accountants (CPAs) (accounting expertise) always support the auditors 
in case of auditor management disputes. Thus, the domain of audit committee research is similar 
in the pre- and post-SOX eras, but in some cases the findings and implications differ. The area of 
post-SOX study is mainly SOX centered and relates to the implications of SOX for audit 
committees’ effectiveness. Exhibit 4 lists the post-SOX audit committee studies discussed in this 
study. While reviewing these post-SOX studies, I also compared the findings and implications of 
selected pre-SOX research that addressed the same issue.  
[Insert Exhibit 4] 
4.1 External and Internal Auditing 
External auditing has received enormous emphasis in both pre- and post-SOX audit 
committee research. This emphasis is reasonable since the main purpose of appointing an audit 
committee is to oversee the quality and independence of auditing. As mandated by SOX Sec. 
202, all auditing and non-auditing services provided by external auditors must be preapproved by 
the audit committee. SOX also addresses widespread concerns about auditor appointment. Sec. 
301 states that the audit committee is responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of external auditors employed by the firm.  The responsibilities of the audit 
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committee also include resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor. The 
audit committee is also supposed to obtain written documents that detail the relationship between 
the auditor and management. Sec. 204 requires external auditors to report to the audit committees 
all accounting policies and alternative treatments of financial information and the treatment 
preferred by the auditors.  
SOX extends the power and responsibility of the audit committee. However, the role of 
the audit committee in monitoring auditors was extensively discussed even before the law’s 
enactment. Using pre-SOX data, researchers investigated the link between different auditing 
issues and audit committee effectiveness. For example, several researchers have discussed the 
complementary role of audit committees in the internal auditing process (Raghunandan et al., 
2001; Goodwin, 2003; Abbott et al., 2007). Although internal auditing was considered important 
in pre-SOX literature, post-SOX literature mostly concentrates on external auditing. The reason 
for fewer studies on the audit committee and internal auditing in the post-SOX era may be 
attributed to SOX highlighting the audit committee’s responsibility to oversee external auditors 
only. The other issue extensively discussed in the pre-SOX literature is the association between 
audit and non-audit fees and audit committee composition criteria, though the findings are 
mixed. For example, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) found a negative association, whereas 
Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) showed a positive association between audit fees 
and audit committees’ independence and expertise. Abbott et al. (2003) found that non-audit fees 
are negatively associated with audit committee independence and expertise. A number of pre-
SOX audit committee studies focused on auditor selection, auditor-client negotiation, and auditor 
resignation issues (Abbott and Parker, 2000; DeZoort et al., 2003; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; 
Lee et al., 2004; Ng and Tan, 2003; Cohen et al., 2002; Raghunandan and Rama, 2003). 
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Researchers have also shown that audit committee composition criteria have significant impacts 
on auditors’ going-concern audit reports (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2003).  
In the post-SOX era, researchers have investigated new issues, such as auditors’ 
restatement recommendations, audit committee members’ multiple directorships, audit 
committees’ compensation, and audit committees’ preapproval decisions for audit and non-audit 
services. Since SOX Sec. 202 requires that all audit and non-audit services provided by an 
external auditor be pre-approved by the audit committee, the question arises as to what factors 
motivate audit committee members to approve auditors’ joint service (audit and non-audit) 
provision. In a post-SOX study, Gaynor et al. (2006) investigated whether audit committees 
consider the non-audit service effects on audit quality and to what extent the mandated 
disclosures affect audit committees’ pre-approval decisions. In their experimental study, the 
authors found that audit committee members recommend unaffiliated firms for non-audit 
services when they see that joint provisions hamper auditors’ objectivity.  They also documented 
that audit committees are less likely to approve joint service provisions when public disclosures 
are required. The findings of this paper support the contention that audit committees are taking 
the pre-approval process very seriously as part of their responsibilities under SOX. As mandated 
by SOX Sec. 301, an audit committee member must be a member of the company’s board of 
directors and must be independent as defined. In a post-SOX study, Hunton and Rose (2008) 
investigated whether members with multiple directorships are more likely to compromise their 
independence. Their experimental study found that directors holding multiple directorships are 
less likely to accept auditors’ restatement recommendations than directors with a single 
directorship. Analysis of post-experiment debriefing revealed that members serving on multiple 
boards are less willing to support restatements due to the potential adverse effects on reputation.  
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SOX requires external auditors to report “all critical accounting policies” and “all 
alternative treatments of financial information within GAAP [generally accepted accounting 
principles] that have been discussed with management” and “the treatment preferred by the 
registered public accounting firm” (Sec. 204) to the audit committee. This requirement provides 
audit committee members with additional information about the range of potential outcomes of 
accounting resolutions. Pomrey (2010) evaluated audit committee members’ investigation of 
financial reporting decisions. His post-SOX experimental analysis found that negotiation 
knowledge influences audit committee members’ discomfort, but does not increase the extent of 
investigations. However, he also documented that audit committee members investigate more 
extensively as accounting decisions become increasingly aggressive and committee members 
have increased accounting experience. The findings provide support for audit committee 
members’ financial expertise and accounting experience having a strong influence on their 
ability to investigate significant accounting decisions. Vermeer et al. (2009) examined audit 
committees’ effectiveness in auditing for non-profit firms. In their survey, they showed that 
external audit fees are positively associated with audit committee independence and expertise.  
In an archival study, Engel et al. (2010) investigated the issue of audit committee 
compensation. Their data reflected both pre- (2000 to 2001) and post-SOX periods (2002 to 
2004). They showed that total compensation for audit committees increased significantly in the 
post-SOX era, with notable increases in the cash retainer and meeting fee components. This 
increase in compensations reflects the SOX requirement for better monitoring and the demand 
for independent and expert committee members. Another post-SOX study that focused on audit 
committee compensation and audit committee effectiveness was conducted by Bierstaker et al. 
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(2012). The authors found that audit committee members are more likely to support the auditor 
in a disagreement when audit committee compensation includes long-term stock options.  
As an extension of their previous study (Cohen et al., 2002), Cohen et al. (2010) 
conducted an experimental study in the post-SOX era investigating how the interaction between 
the external auditor and audit committee affects the firm’s audit process and audit environment. 
They reported that relative to the pre-SOX period, there has been a shift in auditor experience in 
the post-SOX period. They argued that one potential explanation for this shift is that post-SOX 
audit committee members perceive an increased threat of legal liability associated with being on 
the committee that necessitates audit committee members taking their monitoring roles much 
more seriously. Through their semi-structured interviews, they found that the corporate 
governance environment has improved considerably in the post-SOX era with audit committees 
that are substantially more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and powerful.  
Norman et al. (2011) conducted one of the few post-SOX studies that has focused on 
internal auditing and audit committee effectiveness. However, in this study, the authors failed to 
find evidence that increased expertise and increases in audit committee members’ perceived 
powers cause internal auditors to be less willing to waive misstatements. In another post-SOX 
study, Baura et al. (2010) argued that audit committee members’ expertise in auditing and their 
firm-specific knowledge may have substitution effects on the investment in internal auditing. 
They found that the investment in internal auditing is negatively related to the presence of 
auditing experts on the committee and the average tenure of audit committee members, but 
positively related to the number of audit committee meetings (a proxy for diligence).  
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In theoretical research, Schöndube-Pirchegger and Schöndube (2011) offered a model 
that explains the herding equilibrium in which the audit committee ‘‘herds’’ and follows the 
auditor’s judgment no matter what its own insights suggest. Their result is maintained even when 
audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, they added that 
performance-based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases. In another 
post-SOX study, Brown-Liburd and Wright (2011) investigated the potential effect of a past 
client relationship and the strength of the audit committee in the auditor negotiation process. 
Their findings confirmed the importance of the strength of the audit committee and past client 
relationships on auditors’ negotiation planning judgments. Overall, the findings of pre- and post-
SOX audit committee literature that focused on auditing are reasonably consistent. However, 
SOX opens new avenues of research and the findings of these scholarly works reestablish the 
need for SOX to increase audit committee effectiveness. Table 1 offers a summary of post-SOX 
studies that focused on auditing and audit committee composition and effectiveness.  
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2 Financial Reporting Process 
 In Sec. 2, SOX defines the audit committee as a committee established by the board of 
directors to oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the firm. In Sec. 407, 
SOX gives special importance to the financial expertise of audit committee members. The audit 
committee serves as the watchdog for shareholders to protect the integrity of a company’s 
financial reporting. Both pre- and post-SOX researchers have highlighted the impact of audit 
committee effectives on firms’ financial reporting processes. In general, the findings from pre-
SOX studies provide that the audit committee may have underutilized its potential to ensure 
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quality reporting. Less experienced and less financially expert committee members in the pre-
SOX era account for this. In the post-SOX period, researchers have considered new issues, such 
as Internet financial reporting, social ties with the chief executive officer (CEO), and reporting 
quality. A number of pre-SOX studies examined how audit committee expertise improves 
financial reporting quality (McDaniel et al., 2002; DeZoort et al., 2003). Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) showed that only accounting and financial expertise is associated with 
conservative reporting, but this finding does not hold for non-accounting and non-financial 
experts. By using pre-SOX data, researchers have also documented how audit committee 
independence positively affects the financial reporting process (Abbott et al., 2004; Bronson et 
al., 2009; Gendron et al., 2004).  
In the post-SOX period, researchers have also investigated the effectiveness of audit 
committee expertise and independence on firms’ financial reporting processes. However, 
researchers have introduced new issues that could have potential impacts on financial reporting 
quality and audit committee effectiveness. For example, Kelton and Yang (2008) examined the 
relationship between audit committee criteria and reporting transparency, which is measured by 
the level of Internet financial reporting. As compared to traditional, paper-based reporting 
disclosures, Internet financial reporting allows companies to disseminate financial information in 
a more timely manner to a broader audience. The authors hypothesized that SOX’s enhancement 
of audit committee power could also influence firms’ Internet reporting behavior.  
SOX’s emphasis on the audit committee’s role suggests an increased need for theory 
regarding the impact of audit committee members’ compensation. Magilke et al. (2009) 
investigated whether stock-based compensation of audit committee members has any impact on 
firms’ financial reporting process. Their experiments showed that audit committee members 
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prefer biased reporting when receiving stock-based compensation. They also found that audit 
committee members who do not receive stock-based compensation are the most objective; 
however, this finding differs from the findings of pre-SOX research reporting that participants in 
similar roles tended to support biased reporting (Mayhew et al., 2001; Mayhew and Pike, 2004). 
SOX Sec. 301 states that independent audit committee members will not accept any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company. However, in addition to this 
conventional idea of independence, factors such as social ties with the CEO and compensation 
parameters are likely to affect the audit committee’s monitoring behavior. Dey and Liu (2010) 
examined whether an independent director’s past and present social connections and professional 
similarities with the firm’s CEO are related to the functioning of the audit committee. They 
reported that a change in audit committee composition to being fully independent is associated 
with a significant increase in the quality of reporting and a significant decrease in the probability 
of restatements. In contrast to the findings of Magilke et al. (2009), their results suggested that 
when an audit committee's stock-based compensation increases, the quality of financial reporting 
also increases. In another post-SOX archival study, MacGregor (2012) investigated the effects of 
audit committee members’ equity holdings on financial reporting processes. He documented that 
the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior 
year’s earnings level varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets. 
Collectively, his results suggested that equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness 
and financial reporting quality. The only post-SOX analytical research that focused on audit 
committee effectiveness and reporting quality was conducted by Caskey et al. (2010). In this 
study, the authors modeled a reporting process that includes both manager and audit committee 
and examined reporting quality and investors’ pricing effects. Their model showed how a 
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manager privately reports earnings to an independent audit committee that, after its own due 
diligence, modifies the report for public release to investors. The audit committee alters the 
reporting and valuation dynamics by attempting to remove the manager’s reporting bias, but then 
presents the information it has collected with its own bias. Table 2 summarizes post-SOX studies 
that focused on audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.     
[Insert Table 2] 
4.3 Earning Management and Accounting Frauds 
 Managements have incentives to manipulate earnings to achieve pre-determined 
benchmarks or stockholders’ expectations. An independent and expert audit committee member 
can help mitigate earnings management and misreporting. The link between earnings 
management and audit committee members’ multiple directorships, social ties between the CEO 
and audit committee members, and firms’ earnings manipulations are among the new issues 
discussed in the post-SOX era. 
In a frequently cited pre-SOX study, Klein (2002) highlighted the relationship between 
audit committee independence and earning management. She found a negative relationship 
between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. By using pre-SOX data, Bedard 
et al. (2004) documented that aggressive earning management is negatively related to the 
financial and governance expertise of audit committees. In another pre-SOX study, Vafeas 
(2005) argued that audit committee characteristics are related to earning quality in a manner that 
is generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Srinivasan (2005) showed that 
when companies experience accounting restatements, penalties for the audit committee members 
from lawsuits and SEC actions are limited. However, audit committee members experience 
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significant labor market penalties. Farber (2005) documented that fraud firms have fewer audit 
committee meetings and less financial expertise in the audit committee. Archambeault et al. 
(2008) reported a positive association between both short-term and long-term stock option grants 
for audit committee members and the likelihood of accounting restatements. Thus, researchers 
have extensively investigated the issues of earnings management, restatement, and accounting 
fraud by using pre-SOX data.    
 In Sec. 407(a) SOX states that every company must disclose whether or not the audit 
committee has at least one ‘financial expert.’ In Sec. 407(b), SOX defines financial expert as a 
person who has thorough education and experience as a public accountant, auditor, or principal 
financial officer or is from a position involving an understanding of GAAP and financial 
statements. Though neither SOX nor pre-SOX research addressed the issue of industry expertise, 
in a post-SOX study, Cohen et al. (2010) found a significant negative association between 
earning management and audit committee industry expertise. They argued that audit committee 
members should have industry-specific expertise to evaluate the unique accounting judgments in 
that industry. They showed that industry expertise combined with accounting or supervisory 
financial expertise contributes to a lower likelihood of restatement.  
By using post-SOX data, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) extended some pre-SOX studies. 
Consistent with pre-SOX findings, they documented that audit committee accounting expertise is 
positively associated with accruals quality, a commonly used proxy for earning management, and 
this association is stronger when accounting expert audit committee members are independent, 
hold fewer multiple directorships, and have lower tenure in their firms. However, supervisory 
expertise has no impact on the effectiveness of audit committees. Given the significant increase 
in the number of accounting experts serving on audit committees in the post-SOX period, these 
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findings highlight the narrowness of the SOX definition of expertise and the importance of 
controlling expertise-specific characteristics.  
While defining independence in Sec. 407(b), SOX mentions only economic ties between 
the firm and audit committee members. However, the influence of the CEO through social ties 
on audit committee members could hamper the committee’s independence, and this issue has 
been investigated in post-SOX studies. For example, Cohen et al. (2011) showed that auditors 
consider CEO influence over the audit committee’s independence when making difficult audit 
judgments under varying risk scenarios with respect to management’s incentives to manage 
earnings. The only analytical post-SOX study that has addressed the issue of earning 
management and audit committee effectiveness was conducted by Laux and Laux (2009). In 
their model, they showed that the magnitude of earning management in the firm depends on both 
the CEO’s level of manipulation and the audit committee’s level of monitoring. They argued that 
there is a positive spillover effect of the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation on 
the audit committee’s incentive to engage in monitoring when the board’s responsibilities for 
setting CEO pay (compensation committee) and monitoring (audit committee) are separated. 
Table 3 offers a summary of the post-SOX audit committee research that has focused on earnings 
management, earnings restatements, and accounting frauds.    
[Insert Table 3] 
4.4 Internal Control Weakness 
 According to SOX Sec. 302, managers must disclose all internal control problems. Sec. 
404 states that managers must assess the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting 
and that the attestation must be published in 10-Ks. Since the audit committee has power over 
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managers and auditors, it can play a central role in remediation of internal control problems. In 
the pre-SOX period, it was difficult to determine the details of internal control weakness due to 
the unavailability of data. Therefore, in the pre-SOX period, researchers had almost no interest in 
the audit committee’s effectiveness or internal control problems. As SOX mandated the 
disclosure of information, in the post-SOX period researchers have emphasized the investigation 
of how audit committee expertise influences identification, disclosure, and remediation of 
internal control weaknesses. Researchers have collected internal control disclosure data from 8-
Ks and 10-Ks, as mandated by SOX Sec. 302 and Sec. 404.  
In the only pre-SOX study, conducted after SOX but using pre-SOX data, Krishnan 
(2005) first addressed the issue of audit committee characteristics and their association with the 
incidence of internal control problems.  Although information on the quality of internal control 
was not available in the pre-SOX period, companies that changed auditors were required to 
disclose internal control problems pointed out by the predecessor auditors. In this study, the 
author showed that independent and financial expert audit committees are significantly less 
likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems.  By using post-SOX 
data, Zhang et al. (2007) extended Krishnan’s (2005) investigation. They took advantage of the 
detailed information on internal control unleashed by SOX and constructed a bigger sample of 
firms with internal control problems from mandated disclosures in the firms’ 10-Q and 10-K 
filings. They found that firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if 
their audit committees have less financial expertise, more specifically, less accounting financial 
expertise. In another post-SOX study, Hoitash et al. (2009) documented that a lower likelihood 
of disclosing Sec. 404 material weaknesses is associated with more audit committee members 
who have accounting and supervisory experience. More specifically, they found that accounting 
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experts are associated with better control over processes directly related to financial reports, 
while supervisory experts are associated with better control over management processes. They 
also documented a positive association between number of audit committee meetings and 
material weaknesses. This contradicts prior findings reporting that more frequent meetings have 
a better impact (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Farber, 2006; 
Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). They argued that more frequent meetings may be a reaction 
to the discovery of problems in internal controls, rather than increased diligence to ensure better 
control over financial reporting.  
Using post-SOX data, Goh (2009) focused on audit committee expertise and the 
remediation of material weaknesses. He examined firms' timeliness in the remediation of 
material weaknesses on the basis of how fast the firms receive a subsequent unqualified SOX 
Sec. 404 opinion. The findings revealed that the proportion of audit committee members with 
financial expertise is positively associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation of material 
weaknesses. However, this result holds only for non-accounting financial expertise and not for 
accounting financial expertise. He also documented that firms with larger audit committees are 
more likely to take steps to remedy material weaknesses in a timely manner. Taken together, the 
findings shed light on the efficacy of SOX with regard to the composition of the audit 
committee. However, the study did not find a significant association between audit committee 
independence and material weaknesses.  
Naiker and Sharma (2009) investigated whether affiliated former audit firm employees 
serving on the audit committee influence the quality of internal control. Though SOX does not 
directly address the appointment of former audit firm employees to a client's board of directors, 
the SEC imposes a three-year "cooling-off" period before a former audit firm employee is 
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considered independent and able to serve on a client's board and subcommittee, including the 
audit committee. Based on a sample of 1,225 firms making SOX Sec. 404 internal control 
disclosures, Naiker and Sharma (2009) showed a negative relationship between internal control 
deficiencies and the presence of former audit partners on the audit committee who are affiliated 
and unaffiliated with the firm's external auditor. This result suggests that imposing restrictions 
such as the three-year "cooling-off" period on appointing qualified and experienced experts 
affiliated with former audit partners to the audit committee inhibits the SOX objective of 
enhancing the audit committee's oversight of internal control over financial reporting; it also 
suggests that there is no adverse "revolving-door" effect of former audit partners’ being 
appointed to the audit committee. In another archival study, Johnstone et al. (2011) provided a 
significant extension of contemporaneous research on internal control remediation, particularly 
in terms of closely related studies by Goh (2009) and Li et al. (2010). However, unlike Goh 
(2009), their results showed that improvement in audit committee influence, competence, and 
incentives is positively associated with internal control material weakness remediation. Table 4 
summarizes post-SOX audit committee studies that have focused on internal control problems. 
[Insert Table 4] 
4.5 Other Post-SOX Audit Committee Studies 
Researchers have established that reporting quality is positively associated with audit 
committees’ accounting financial expertise. However, even after SOX implementation, most 
audit committee financial experts have non-accounting financial expertise (DeFond et al., 2005; 
Davidson et al., 2004). Using post-SOX data, Krishnan and Lee (2009) examined the 
determinants of firms’ choices of accounting and non-accounting financial experts on audit 
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committees. They found that firms with higher litigation risks are more likely to have accounting 
financial experts on their audit committee. In a post-SOX study, Beasley et al. (2009) provided 
extensive information about the audit committee oversight process obtained from in-depth 
interviews of 42 individuals actively serving on audit committees. In their survey, the authors 
found that audit committee members strive to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting 
and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees. They also found that many responses 
varied with time of appointment (pre-SOX versus post-SOX) of the audit committee members.  
Defond et al. (2005) investigated market reactions to the appointment of financial expert 
audit committee members. Because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial 
experts narrowly to just include accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more 
broadly to include non-accounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), Defond et al. (2005) 
separately examined the appointments of each type of expert. They found a positive market 
reaction (three-day cumulative abnormal returns) to the appointment of accounting financial 
experts to the audit committee but no reaction to the appointment of non-accounting financial 
experts. Davidson et al. (2004) conducted a similar study and documented a positive stock price 
reaction when new members of the audit committee have more financial expertise. In another 
post-SOX study, Ronen and Berman (2004) argued that although SOX significantly enhances the 
role of audit committees it fails to address the major financial scandal problems, such as agency 
cost and management entrenchment. In their survey study, they argued that audit committee 
members’ independence is just a myth since regulatory mechanisms impose penalties ex-post, 
and ex-post mechanisms are nowhere as effective as ex-ante mechanisms.  
After implementation of SOX, researchers addressed some new issues, such as how 
earnings forecasts, cost of debt, and interactions among different committees are linked to audit 
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committee composition criteria. However, several researchers used pre-SOX data while 
investigating these new issues. For example, by using pre-SOX data, Dey (2008) showed that 
firms with a higher level of agency conflicts have higher audit committee independence and 
expertise. By using pre-SOX data, Gendron and Bedard (2006) documented that audit committee 
effectiveness depends on the background of audit committee members, ceremonial features of 
audit committee meetings, and reflective interpretations of substantive practices and activities 
taking place during the meetings. DeZoort (2008) argued that experienced audit committee 
members make more consistent judgments and provide more technical content in reporting. 
Vafeas (2001) explained how the likelihood of audit committee appointment increases with the 
degree of outside director independence and decreases with compensation committee 
membership and length of board tenure. Beasley and Salterio (2002) reported that inclusion of 
more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum is associated with a 
larger and more independent board. In another study, by using pre-SOX data, Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) found that firms with effective audit committees are more likely to make or 
update earnings forecasts; their forecasts are also more accurate and elicit a more favorable 
market response. Anderson et al. (2004) found that fully independent audit committees are 
associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Thus, after the implementation of 
SOX, researchers expanded the literature addressing new issues derived from SOX. However, in 
most cases the authors used pre-SOX data.  Even so, one can assume that the findings would not 
differ significantly if the authors of those studies had used post-SOX data. Table 5 summarizes 
other post-SOX audit committee studies that are not discussed in previous sections.  




5.0 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the audit committee literature is extensive and contributes an enormous body of 
knowledge. The arguments and findings established by the pre- and post-SOX researchers are 
reasonably consistent. However, in the post-SOX period, researchers have investigated new 
research issues that are mostly driven by SOX. These issues include the role of the audit 
committee in the firm’s internal control weaknesses, the role of financial accounting expert audit 
committee members in limiting misreporting, and market reactions to the appointment of expert 
audit committee members, among others. This literature review examines the conjecture, 
documented in both the pre- and post-SOX eras, that audit committee independence and 
expertise increase audit committee effectiveness. However, the definitions of independence and 
expertise given in SOX are narrow and insufficient to accomplish the goals of the oversight 
process. The SEC has published its own rule that defines audit committee expertise in a more 
elaborate manner. In the post-SOX era, researchers have differentiated the types of expertise and 
demonstrated how different expertise (e.g., financial, supervisory, accounting, non-accounting, 
industry) differently affect the audit committee’s monitoring process. These studies have 
reported that type of expertise matters in audit committees’ oversight process, which implies a 
limitation of SOX regarding the definition of audit committee expertise. Further studies may 
address how the expertise and independence of audit committees differ in regulated versus 
unregulated industries.  
The relevant dominance of archival and experimental research in the post-SOX era 
suggests the need for more theoretical approaches that strengthen the underlying assumptions of 
audit committee composition and the committee’s effectiveness with regard to the monitoring 
process. Another potential area of future research is audit committee compensation criteria. 
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Though in post-SOX literature, researchers have addressed how different forms of compensation 
affect audit committees’ monitoring processes, the findings are inconclusive. Future research 
should focus on how compensation interacts with other attributes of audit committees and what 
forms of compensation interact with independence and expertise to make audit committees most 
effective.  
The audit committee is an effective corporate governance mechanism.  However, the 
power of the audit committee can be affected by other governance players, such as the board of 
directors and institutional investors. Future studies should highlight how the audit committee 
interacts with the board of directors and acts as a complement to the governance process. Since 
the board empowers and selects the audit committee, strong board support is a requisite for audit 
committee effectiveness. Researchers can inspect how the audit committee’s reliance on the 
board varies and how it is associated with the audit committee’s monitoring process. Another 
future research area might be the interactions between management and the audit committee in 
the post-SOX environment. Since it is difficult to observe management-audit committee 
interaction, controlled experiments may help to investigate how SOX requirements increase audit 
committee activities in terms of audit committee interaction with required parties. Future 
research can investigate whether the ability to attract competent and expert audit committee 
members varies with company characteristics such as company reputation, size, agency conflicts, 
and audit committee compensation policy, among others. Future research can also examine how 
other regulatory reforms interact with SOX and influence audit committee effectiveness.  
Although in the post-SOX era researchers have extended the audit committee literature, 
the generalizability of post-SOX audit committee research needs to be assessed. Almost all 
studies have been conducted in the U.S. context. Future research should focus on international 
26 
 
settings to investigate whether the findings hold where different regulatory requirements like 
SOX are in effect. In such settings, one can examine whether cultural and economic differences 
affect audit committee composition and effectiveness or whether the findings vary due to act-
specific criteria. Last, but not least, this study suggests the need to investigate two fundamental 
questions: To what extent is SOX successful in empowering audit committees? Is the role of the 
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Table 1: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Auditing 
















n and multiple 
directorship 











Audit committee members are less 
likely to accept auditor's 
restatement recommendation than 
adjustment recommendations. 
Directors with multiple 
directorships are less willing to 
support restatements due to the 
potential adverse effects on their 
reputation. 
N/A 
          
Pomeroy 
(2010) 




















Audit committee members 
investigate more extensively as 
accounting decisions become 
increasingly aggressive and audit 
committee members with 
accounting experience are 
particularly through their 
investigations 




variable to examine 
experience may 
be criticized as 
subjective 










Archival 125 largest 
non-profit 
organization 
2003 Audit fees Donation, debt, 
size, asset, audit 
committee 
independence 
Good audit committee and internal 
audit are complement not 
substitute for monitoring external 
auditors 
Future research 
can test whether 
the audit fee 







































Total compensation and cash 
retainers paid to audit committees 
are positively correlated with audit 
fees and the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
















TAR Audit and non-
audit service 










will  improve 
audit quality,  
disclosure 
The pre-approval decision for joint 
(audit & non-audit) service 
provision is influenced by whether 
the audit committee believes audit 
quality improves. Audit 
committees are less likely to 
approve joint service provision 
when public disclosures are 
required.  
Future research 
could be to 
examine the types 
of risks audit 
committees view 











































Corporate governance environment 
has improved considerably in the 
post-SOX era with audit 
committees that are substantially 
more active, diligent, 
knowledgeable, and powerful. 
 
Future research 
can examine how 
the litigation 
regime in various 
countries 
potentially affects 





























The results do not indicate that 
increased audit committee 
expertise and associated increases 
in audit committee members’ 
perceived powers cause internal 












































fairness, no. of 
years served in 
the committee,  
 
Audit committee members are 
more likely to support the auditor 
in an accounting disagreement 
when audit committee 
compensation includes long-term 
stock options and when members 
perceive that the failure to record 








































     
A herding equilibrium exists in 
which the audit committee 
‘‘herds’’ and follows the auditor’s 







































Auditors are contending when both 
the audit committee is strong and 
the past relationship is contending. 
 
Future research 
can examine the 
extent to which 
auditors are 


































and expertise of 
audit committee 
 
The investment in internal auditing 
is negatively related to the 
presence of auditing experts on the 
committee and the average tenure 
of audit committee members, but 
positively related to the number of 
audit committee meetings (a proxy 




Table 2: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Financial Reporting Quality 








Limitations / Future 
research 



























Firms with a diligent audit 
committee and a higher 
percentage of audit 
committee members with 
financial expertise are more 
likely to engage in Internet 
financial reporting which 
reflects reporting quality and 
disclosure transparency  
Future research could 
examine whether 
different audit 
committee expertise are 
also associated with 
various criteria of IFR, 
such as information 
quality and reporting 
frequency. 







bias of Audit 
committee 
Modeling     From audit committee's 
perspective, the manager's 
financial reporting bias is a 
source of noise. The audit 
committee attempts to 
remove this noise, but then 
presents its report with its 
own bias.  
N/A 




















bonus paid to 
committee 
Audit committee members 
compensated with current 
stock-based compensation 
prefer aggressive reporting 
and audit committee members 
compensated with future 
stock-based compensation 
prefer overly conservative 
reporting 
The major limitation-
audit committees make 
decisions as a group not 
as individual, they 
suppress liability-based 
incentives and the 
interaction between 
committee and auditor  
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Limitations / Future 
research 
































Firms with increases in 
independent audit committee 
directors with social and 
professional connections to 
the firm's CEO are associated 
with lower operating 
performance and poorer 
financial reporting quality. 
Financial reporting quality 
increases with audit 
committee's stock based 
compensation.  
The study cannot 
completely mimic SOX 
definition of audit 
committee  
independence due to 
data limitations 

























There is positive relation 
between audit committee 
compensation and the 
demand for monitoring of the 
financial reporting process. 
Total compensation and cash 
retainers paid to audit 
committees are positively 
correlated with audit fees. 
Future research can 
investigate how 
compensation 
incentives interact with 
reputation incentives to 
impact the effectiveness 
of the audit committees 


















1370 and  
2389 firm-
observations 
for two sets 
















Equity holdings enhance 
audit committee effectiveness 
by increasing a committee’s 
responsiveness to risk factors. 
 
Future studies - how 
social relation between 
audit committee and 
executives influence 
committee’s decisions.  
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Table 3: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Earning Management and Accounting Frauds 
 








Limitations / Future 
research 







Modeling     The increase in CEO equity incentives 
does not necessarily lead to a higher 
level of earning management because 
the audit committee will adjust its 
oversight effort in response to a 
change in CEO incentives.  
N/A 





















(high vs. low) 
When management's incentives for 
earning management are high, 
auditors are less likely to waive as 
much of an adjustments when the 
CEO has less influence over the audit 
committee's independence than when 
the CEO's influence is greater.   
Future study could 
examine how auditors 
trade-off audit committee 
independence and 
financial as well as 
industry expertise in 
resolving difficult 
reporting issues 































A significant lower likelihood of 
restatement is found when the audit 
committee has an industry expert. 
Both industry expertise and 
accounting or supervisory financial 
expertise contributes to lower 
likelihood of restatement. 
Future research can 
employ experimental 
methods  to determine 
the accounting issues 
and risk assessments 
that would benefit 












Limitations / Future 
research 






















A positive relationship exists between 
accruals quality and audit committee 
accounting experts who are 
independent, hold fewer multiple 
directorship and have lower tenure in 
their firms. The most positive effect of 
accounting expertise is achieved when 
it is combined with finance expertise 
whereas supervisory expertise has no 
incremental impact on committee's 
effectiveness.  
Limitations – the study 
rely on the historical 
employment data of 
directors disclosed by 
firms. The results may 
be biased by the extent 
of historical employment 
coverage. The accruals 
quality may be affected 
by other requirements 
of SOX during the 






Table 4: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Internal Control Weakness 
          





































Positive relation is found 
between non-accounting 
financial expertise and 
timeliness in the redemption 
of material weaknesses. Firms 
with larger audit committees 
are more likely to remediate 
material weaknesses in a 
timely manner. 
The sample in this 
study comprises 
firms with material 
weaknesses and 
may thus be biased 



























Firms are more likely to be 
identified with an internal 
control weakness, if audit 
committees have less financial 
expertise or, have less 
accounting financial expertise 
and non-accounting financial 
expertise. They are more 
likely to be identified with an 
internal control weakness, if 
the audit committee members 




          







































Lower likelihood of 
disclosing 404 material 
weaknesses is associated with 
relatively more audit 
committee members having 
accounting and supervisory 
experience. The nature of 
material weaknesses varies 
with the type of experience. A 
positive association exists 
between the number of audit 
committee meetings and 
material weaknesses.  
They assess the 
association of audit 
committee expertise 
with internal 
control in two years 
after implementation 
of SOX. Future 
research should 




time to adapt 
regulatory change. 























A negative relation exists 
between internal control 
deficiencies and presence of 
former audit partners on the 
committee who are affiliated 
and unaffiliated with firm's 
external auditor. Imposing 
restrictions of three years 
"cooling-off" rule inhibits 
SOX’s objective to appoint 
expert committee members. 
Due to lack of 
data, they are 
unable to test 
whether former 
audit partners who 
actually worked on 
the audit of a client 
are as effective as 
former audit 
partners who have 
not worked on the 
audit of the client. 
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Improvements in audit 
committee influence, 
competence and incentives are 
each positively associated 
with internal control material 
weaknesses remediation. 
 
Limitations - there 











Table 5: Other Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature 
 
          



























index, , board 
size, holding by 
institutional 
independence,  
Firms with higher litigation 
risk are more likely to have 
accounting financial experts 
on their audit committee. 
However, the association 
between litigation risk and 
the likelihood of appointing 
accounting financial experts 
occurs for firms with strong 
governance but not for those 
with weak governance. 
Limitations – the 
sample consists of 
Fortune 1000 
companies. So the 
results may not be 
generalizable to 
the population of 
other firms.   


























Positive market reaction 
exists between appointment 
of accounting financial 
experts to audit committee 
but no reaction to non-
accounting financial experts 




          


























 Many audit committee 
members strive to provide 
effective monitoring of 
financial reporting and seek 
to avoid serving on 
ceremonial audit committees.  
Future research 
could be to find 
what factors 
improves audit             
committee’s ability 
to identify and 
respond to high 
risk fraud condition.  








Descriptive  2003 
 
 Audit committee member’s 
independence is a myth 
which cannot be easily made 
to happen. SOX has failed to 
address the major financial 
scandal problem - such as 
agency cost and management 
entrenchment problem, 
N/A 
 
